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Allocation of Advertising and Research Dollars 
In the Florida Orange-Juice Industry 
 
The Florida citrus industry spends money on both production research and advertising.  A 
significant portion of the money available for these activities comes from self imposed taxes on 
Florida citrus growers.  The largest tax is collected by the Florida Department of Citrus (FDOC) and 
the largest portion of this money has been used for promotion and advertising.  The FDOC also 
funds post-harvest research, as well as research on mechanical harvesting.  Growers also pay a tax 
specifically for production research.  Additionally, State-of-Florida and Federal monies are used to 
support citrus research through the University of Florida and the USDA.  
 
Advertising by the FDOC focuses on increasing the demand for Florida citrus products, 
while the State’s production research focuses on maintaining and increasing supply (supplying more 
at a given cost or supplying the same at a lower cost).  Florida=s major citrus product, orange juice 
(OJ), is advertised nationally through TV commercials and other media.  The FDOC post-harvest 
research has resulted in various improvements in the processing and fresh packaging sectors, 
including, for example, the development of frozen concentrated orange juice (FCOJ) in the mid 
1940s.  Production oriented research conducted by the University of Florida and the USDA has 
resulted in new fruit varieties, new technologies and improved production practices. 
 
With tens of millions of dollars spent on advertising and research, a question is Awhat is the 
best allocation of a given budget to these two alternatives.@  This has become a particularly 
important question given the recent threat that two diseases, citrus canker and greening, pose to 
Florida citrus production.  There must be production, of course, to have an industry, which will 
require a major research effort to fight these diseases, but, on the other hand, there must also be 
sufficient demand for Florida citrus growers to earn a return that keeps them in business.   
 
Various studies have found that FDOC advertising has had substantial impacts on OJ demand 
(e.g., FABA; Ward et al; MAP; Brown; and Brown and Lee).  A study on post-harvest research in 
the Florida citrus processing sector also found that this activity had a high rate of return (Stranahan; 
and Shonkwiler and Stranahan).  Studies on the gains from research and promotion for other 
commodities have also been conducted (e.g., Wohlgenant; Chung and Kaiser; Chyc and Goddard; 
Cranfield; and Fuglie and Heisley).  In this paper, a world OJ model is developed and simulated to 
examine the OJ advertising-research allocation issue. The focus is on maximization of Florida 
grower revenue net of the costs of advertising and research.  
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World Model and Optimal Advertising and Research 
 
The world OJ model developed in this paper is comprised of two demand equations and two 
supply equations.  The first demand equation is for the U.S., given the focus of the study is on how 
advertising and research impact Florida grower revenue, as well as the fact that the U.S. is the 
largest OJ market in the world. The second demand equation is for Europe, the second largest 
market, and other major foreign markets, all of which is referred to as the rest of the world (ROW). 
On the supply side, Brazil is the largest producer of OJ in the world accounting for over 50% of the 
world=s production, while the U.S. is the second largest producer accounting for about 30% of the 
world=s total.  Over the last decade, Florida has accounted for 91% to 98% of the OJ produced in the 
U.S.  Given the dominance of Florida and Brazil, the two supply equations in the model are for 
Florida and Brazil production (a relatively small amount of other U.S. production is included with 
Florida production). 
 
The U.S. is treated as a net importer of OJ, while the ROW is a treated as a net exporter, 
following Spreen, Brewster and Brown (2003) and McClain (1989).  The import-export equilibrium 
is determined by an excess-demand, excess-supply relationship.  Formally, the model is specified as  
 
(1)  q1 = b10 + b11 (p + c) + b12 log( A)      (U.S. OJ demand) 
(2)  q2 = b20 + b21  (p-t)        (ROW  OJ  demand) 
(3)  s1 = c10 + c11 (p - m10 - m11log(R))      (Florida OJ supply)  
(4)  s2 = c20 + c21 (p -  m20 - m21log(R) - t)     (ROW OJ supply)  
(5)  q1 - s1  = s2 - q2       (Equilibrium)   




i)  A and R are U.S. advertising and research dollars, respectively; 
ii)  q1 and s1 are the U.S. quantities of OJ demanded and supplied, respectively; 
iii)  q2 and s2 are ROW quantities of OJ demanded and supplied (Brazil), respectively;  
iv)  p is the Florida FOB price; 
v)  t is the transfer cost from the ROW to the U.S.(U.S. tariff and transportation costs);  
vi)  c is the U.S. retail-FOB price margin, i.e., p + c is the U.S. retail price;  
vii)  m10 and m20  are fixed FOB-grower price margins for  Florida and ROW, 
respectively; 
viii)  m11 and m21 are additional margin parameters associated with the level of research, 
i.e., m10 + m11log(R) and m20 + m21log(R)  are U.S. and ROW grower price margins, 
respectively, and (p - m10 - m11log(R)) and (p – m20 - m21log(R)-t) are the Florida and 
ROW grower prices, adjusted for research costs, respectively; and 
ix)  the b’s and c’s, as well as the m’s, are fixed parameters 
 
 
The parameters b11 and b21, the demand slopes with respect to price, are negative; b12, the 
advertising coefficient, is positive; c11 and c21, the supply slopes with respect to price, are positive; 3 
 
m10 and m20 are positive; and m11 and m21 are negative (more research smaller margins).  Price p is 
set such that excess demand in the U.S. (U.S. imports) is equal to excess supply in the ROW (ROW 
exports). 
 
Advertising in the model is FDOC generic advertising expenditures.  It is assumed that this 
advertising only impacts U.S. demand, with FDOC advertising messages occurring primarily in the 
U.S.  That is, with b12 being positive, an increase in advertising A results in an increase in U.S. 
demand, equation (1). 
  
Research is U.S. research expenditures.  It is assumed that the largest impact of this research 
is on the U.S. grower price margin as intended (m11).   In addition, U.S. research is assumed to have 
spillover effects on the ROW grower price margin (m21).  The marginal impacts of research on U.S. 
and ROW production are ∂s1/∂R = -c11m11/R > 0 and ∂s2/∂R = -c21m21/R > 0, respectively.  
 
Advertising and research are specified in terms of logs, and thus have diminishing returns.  
This specification allows a solution to the revenue maximization problem.   
 
Equation (6) is the objective function and indicates Florida grower revenue net of advertising 
and research costs. Specifically, the term (p – m10 - m11log(R)) is defined as the on-tree price 
adjusted for research costs.  The parameter m10 indicates average processing costs, and pick and haul 
costs, and the term m11log(R) indicates average production (cultural) costs due to greening as well as 
canker.  This amount is assumed to depend on the level of greening research.  The parameter m11 is 
negative---an increase in  research reduces the average costs due to greening.  
 
The endogenous variables are p and the left-hand side variables of equations (1) through (4). 
 The exogenous variables are A, R, c and t.  The levels of A and R are chosen so as to maximize net 
revenue. 
 
An increase in advertising A increases demand and price, while an increase in research R 
increases supply and decreases price.  Changes in price, in turn, further impact demand and supply 




(7)  ∂p/∂A = (b12 /A) / (c11 + c21 - b11  - b21), 
 
while the impact of research on price is 
 
(8)  ∂p/∂R = (c11 m11 + c21 m21) / R / (c11 + c21 - b11 - b21). 
 
Differentiating equation (6) with respect to A and R, the first order conditions for  
                                                 
1 Substituting the right hand sides of equations (1) through (4) into equation (5), and solving for price, find the reduced 




maximization of net revenue are
2 
 




(10)  ∂π/∂R = (∂p/∂R – m11/R) (s1 + c11 (p - m10- m11log(R))) -1 = 0. 
 
The ratio of optimal advertising to research expenditures can be found by equating equations 
(9) and (10) and solving for A/R, using equation (7) and (8), i.e.,
3  
 
(11)  A/R = b12 / ((c11 m11 + c21 m21) – m11(c11 + c21 - b11  - b21)). 
 
  The first term on the right-hand side of equation (9), ∂p/∂A  (s1 + c11 (p- m10- m11log(R))), is 
the marginal revenue with respect to advertising, which is positive given the impact of advertising 
on price, ∂p/∂A, is positive, along with the other parameter assumptions and the condition that the 
net price term, (p - m10- m11log(R)), is positive.  The second term, -1, is the negative of the marginal 
cost of advertising.  Advertising expenditures are increased until marginal revenue of advertising 
equals the marginal cost. 
 
In equation (10), the first term on the right hand side is the marginal revenue of research.  
This term can be decomposed into two parts. The first part is (∂p/∂R) (s1 + c11 (p- m10- m11log(R))), 
which is always negative, given the impact of research on price, ∂p/∂R, is negative, along with the 
other parameter assumptions.  The second part of the marginal revenue of research, (-m11/R) (s1 + c11 
(p- m10- m11log(R))), is positive given research reduces or negatively impacts the margin (m11 < 0).   
At the optimal level of research the second part must exceed the first part (in absolute value) for 
marginal revenue to be positive, and, as in the case of advertising, research expenditures are 
increased to the point where the marginal revenue of research equals the marginal cost or one dollar. 
 
 
The  model is solved for given values for the parameters.  A critical issue is that prior 
estimates on the impacts of greening research on the Florida and ROW price margins (m11 and m21) 
                                                 
2 The second order conditions are ∂
2π/∂A∂A < 0; ∂




2 > 0.  In 
the empirical analysis these conditions were met. 
 
 
3 The sequence of results for this solution using basic algebraic operations are 
i)  ∂p/∂A  (s1 + c11 (p-m10 - m11log(R))) – 1 = (∂p/∂R – m11/R) (s1 + c11 (p - m10- m11log(R))) -1,  
ii)  ∂p/∂A  = (∂p/∂R – m11/R),  
iii)  A/R = ((∂p/∂A)A) / ((∂p/∂R – m11/R)R) 
iv)  A/R = b12 / (c11 + c21 - b11  - b21) / ((c11 m11 + c21 m21) / (c11 + c21 - b11 - b21) – m11), 
v)  A/R = b12 / ((c11 m11 + c21 m21) – m11(c11 + c21 - b11  - b21)). 




are not available, with greening being a new disease to Florida and no cure for this disease having 
been found in other citrus producing regions.  The approach taken here is to assume a given level of 
research expenditures will reduce the average cost of greening and canker to a negligible level.  This 
assumption is then used to set m11 and m12, or the curvature of the price-margin responses.  Unless 
by chance, the optimal research-expenditure  level, based on this setting of the model, will not be the 
same as the initial level assumed and will be significantly different in some cases, as the empirical 
results indicate. Nevertheless, the assumption on research expenditures has a strong influence on the 
optimal level found and thus results in some circularity.  To examine this issue, alternative 
assumptions on the level of research expenditures are considered.   
 
Given the research assumptions made here, the model solutions for advertising expenditures 
are conditional.   That is, the optimal level of advertising needed to support grower returns is 
conditional on the research assumption.  Thus, the results of this study do not indicate the optimal 
level of research, but to what extent advertising is required to support grower returns in an 
environment where substantial greening research is needed.  
 
Turning to the other parameters, the values of the demand slopes b11 and b21 are based on 
U.S. and ROW demand elasticities reported by Brown, Spreen and Lee.  Initially, U.S. and ROW 
demand levels were set at 1,300 and 1,850 million single strength (SSE) gallons, respectively; price 
p was set at $1.50 per SSE gallon; and the retail-FOB price margin c was set at $3.75 per SSE 
gallon.  The slope b11 is the U.S. retail demand elasticity (-.70) times U.S. gallons divided by the 
U.S. retail price, while the slope b21 is the ROW FOB demand elasticity (-.34) times ROW gallons 
divided by the FOB price.
4  The parameter b12  was set based on advertising elasticities, 
(∂q1/∂A)(A/q1), estimated by FABA and MAP.  A range of advertising elasticities were considered--
-.08, .25 and .42.  The initial value of advertising was set at $30 million.  The elasticity 
(∂q1/∂A)(A/q1) times the initial value for q1 yields (∂q1/∂A)A, which is treated as an approximation 
of the gallons demanded due to advertising; this, in turn, is divided by log(A) to obtain b12.  The 
intercepts b10 and b20 are determined as the residuals, based on the initial values.   
                                                 
4 The magnitudes of the supply and demand shifts due to research and advertising, along with the elasticities of supply 
and demand with respect to price are basic factors that determine revenue.  For a linear relationship between quantity 
demanded and price, the maximum revenue occurs at the point where the elasticity of demand is unity.  If demand is 
elastic (the elasticity of demand is greater than unity in absolute value), an increase in quantity increases revenue; if 
demand is inelastic (the elasticity of demand is less than unity in absolute value), an increase in quantity decreases 
revenue. When demand is fixed and supply increases, the supply-demand equilibrium moves along the demand curve, 
and revenue increases (decreases) over the elastic (inelastic) portion of the demand curve.  Thus, research that shifts the 
supply curve outward would only increase revenue when demand is elastic.  Given many agricultural commodities 
operate where demand is inelastic, such research would lower revenue.  
  On the other hand, when the supply curve is fixed with a non-negative slope, and demand increases (the supply-
demand equilibrium moves along the supply curve), revenue will always increase.  The percentage change in revenue is 
the percentage change in price plus the percentage change in quantity, both of which will depend on the elasticity of 
supply.  
  When there are multiple markets and suppliers, behaving competitively, as assumed in the present study, the 
revenue situation for a particular supplier becomes more complicated, but the supply and demand elasticities across 
markets and suppliers continue to be important factors.  Maximum revenue for a supplier may occur where the individual 




  The supply slopes with respect to price are based on long-run supply elasticity estimates of 
.25 for Florida and .50 for the ROW.  These values are based on the model underlying the FDOC 
report “Florida Citrus Production Trends, 2007-08 through 2016-17.”  The U.S. (ROW) long-run 
supply elasticity times the supply level s1 (s2), divided by the grower price (p-m10 or p-m20-t) , yields 
c11 (c21). Initial values for s1 and s2 were 1,050 and 2,100  million single strength (SSE) gallons, 
respectively (1,000 gallons for Florida and 50 gallons for the rest of the U.S.).   
 
The model thus reflects long-run responses for given levels of advertising and research 
sustained over time.  
 
  The margins m11 and m21 are based on estimates of additional production costs due to citrus 
greening and canker made by Muraro.  Two estimates were considered---greening and canker 
increase average production costs by $.25 and $.50 per SSE gallon.  These additional costs (∆c) were 
divided by the log of an assumed research level to obtain the parameters m11.  That is, given R, the 
parameter m11 is approximated by -∆c/log(R).  For example, when ∆c = -.25 and R=$1 million, the 
minimum research level assumed to occur, the term m11 log (1) = 0; when R=$30 million, m11 log 
(30) = -.25, i.e., to approximate the curvature of the price margin response to research, $1 million 
spent on research per year will not reduce the average cost of greening, but $30 million (sustained 
over time) will reduce the cost by $.25/gallon.  The parameter m21 was assumed to be 75% the level 
of m11, assuming spillover effects are only partial.  
 
  Assuming the cost of greening is $.25/gallon (.50/gallon), the margins m10 and m20 were set 
at $.85 ($1.10) per SSE gallon and $.60 ($.85) per SSE gallon, respectively, to reflect processing, 
and pick and haul costs (industry estimates).  The U.S. tariff (FCOJ) was set at $.30 per SSE gallons 
and transportation costs were set at $.10 per SSE gallon. 
 
  As alluded to earlier, it is unknown how much research will be needed to overcome greening 
and the degree that research can save trees and increase productivity; one can only speculate.  In this 
study, three baseline levels of research expenditures (R) are considered---$30 million, $45 million, 
and $60 million per year.  The baseline research expenditure levels are assumed for  the scenarios 
where the average greening/canker cost is $.25/gallon. When the average greening/canker cost is 
$.50/gallon, assumed research expenditures are doubled.  Associated price-margin, research 
elasticities are m11/m1, where m11 is calculated as discussed above assuming a research expenditure 
level, and m1 = m10 + m11log(R) or the U.S. FOB-grower price margin; i.e., m11 = ∂m1/∂log(R) = 
(∂m1/∂R)R, and thus the elasticity of this margin with respect to research is ∂m1/∂log(R)/m1 or 
m11/m1.  Note that the absolute value of this elasticity varies inversely with the assumed level of R 
underlying it.  The margin elasticity evaluated at the initial, without-research margin level 
($.85/gallon or $1.10/gallon) is used to define a scenario.  
 
  Eighteen scenarios were considered based on the three advertising elasticity levels, three 
research levels or implied research elasticity levels mentioned above, and the two greening/canker 
cost assumptions. 
  7 
 
In summary, less is know about how the supply price margin might response to a given level 
of research expenditures, than how demand responses to a given level of advertising expenditures.  
Thus, importantly, the model provides a better indication of optimal advertising expenditures 




Optimal advertising and research expenditures for the various scenarios are shown in Table 
1.  Relatively large amounts of advertising are needed to optimize grower revenue, except for the 
low-advertising elasticity scenarios.  For the mid and high advertising elasticity assumptions along 
with the assumption that greening and canker costs are $.25 per SSE gallon (scenarios 4 through 9), 
advertising expenditures are greater than research expenditures, although research expenditures are 
relatively large.  For the low advertising elasticity assumptions (scenarios 1-3), research 
expenditures exceed advertising expenditures.
5  
The model solutions when the average cost of greening and canker is increased to $.50 per 
SSE gallon along with associated parameter settings (scenarios 10-18), indicate lower levels of 
advertising expenditures and higher levels of research expenditures.  Although relatively high, 
advertising expenditures are less than research expenditure for these scenarios.  
 
As mentioned earlier, since less is known about how the supply-price margin might respond 
to research expenditures, than how demand might respond to advertising expenditures, the optimal 
levels of research should be treated with caution.  What the model indicates is that significant 
advertising expenditures are needed to optimize grower returns for the research assumptions made.
    
Price (FOB) ranges from $1.52 to $1.67 per SSE gallon.  U.S. supply recovers, ranging from 
1,058 million to 1,126 million SSE gallons; while the ROW supply recovers somewhat less based on 
the assumption that the spillover of research is not full, ranging from 1,935 million to 2,166 million 
SSE gallons.  U.S. consumption ranges from 1,240 million to 1,439 million SSE gallons (the effects 
                                                 
5 The optimal advertising levels in Table 1 under the assumptions that the advertising elasticity is .08 (MAP 
estimate) and the cost of greening and canker is $.25 per SSE gallon, are roughly around $14 million, which may 
differ from expectations that optimal advertising should be higher for the MAP assumption.  There are several 
possible explanations for this difference.  First, the curvature assumption related to diminishing returns to advertising 
likely differs between this study and the MAP study (the MAP advertising response is embedded in a proprietary 
stock variable and cannot be determined explicitly).  Second, initial values of the various parameters may be 
influencing the results.  Third, in the current study, advertising is modeled in a world setting, as opposed to the U.S. 
retail market setting in which the MAP study was made.  Fourth and  related to the previous two points, the current 
study examines long-run effects as opposed to shorter-run effects implied by the MAP study (e.g., there are no long-
run supply responses in the MAP study).  To clarify, given U.S. demand under the .08 advertising elasticity 
assumption and the short-run assumption that price is fixed at $1.60 per SSE gallon at the FOB level or $1.00 at the 
on-tree level, optimal advertising would be determined from  the first order condition ∂π/∂A = p ∂q/∂A – 1 = 0, or, 
based on equation (1),  p b12/A -1 = 0, or A = p b12 where is b12 = 30.6 based on the initial setting,  or evaluating this 
result at the FOB level,  A = ($1.60) (30.6) =  $49.0 million or at the grower level, A = ($1.00) ( 30.6) = $30.6 
million.  Thus, in this case, the short-run estimate of the optimal level of advertising is significantly larger than the 
comparable long-run estimate.  Moreover, this example indicates that the level in the marketing chain, at which the 
optimal level of advertising is based, may dramatically influence the results---at the retail price level, an even higher 
optimal advertising level would occur for this short-run example.  
 8 
 
of higher prices are offset by various degrees by the effects of higher optimal advertising).  ROW 
consumption ranges from 1,779 million to 1,840 million SSE gallons at the higher prices projected.   
 
The ratio of advertising to research expenditures based on equation (11) are shown in Table 
2.
6  This table illustrates how the ratio changes for different assumptions on the levels of research 




  In this study, an OJ model was developed to examine the optimal advertising-research mix to 
maximize Florida grower revenue net of the costs of these activities.  The model is based on 
assumed coefficients reflecting the impacts of prices, advertising and research.  The effects of prices 
on demand and supply, as well as the effect of advertising on demand, were set based on findings of 
prior studies.  The effect of research on supply is less certain, and a range of research effects was 
considered.  A range of advertising effects was also considered given the study’s focus.   The model 
solutions for the various advertising and research assumptions considered indicate that optimal 
advertising expenditures are significant.   
  
  Finally, it should be noted that the findings of this study do not indicate how much research 
is needed.  The model solutions for optimal research expenditures, although substantial, are closely 
related to the assumed research-elasticity levels or, equivalently, the research expenditures assumed 
to be needed to overcome greening and canker.  The study simply indicates that, to maximize grower 
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%∆R  mil. $  mil. $  $/ga.  $/box  mil. ga. mil. ga. mil. ga.  mil. ga. 
1 0.25  0.08  -0.09 14.3 38.4 1.52 6.03  1273 1840 1067 2047
2 0.25  0.08  -0.08 14.2 34.0 1.55 5.94  1269 1830 1061 2038
3 0.25  0.08  -0.07 14.1 31.5 1.56 5.89  1267 1825 1058 2033
4 0.25  0.25  -0.09 45.2 38.8 1.54 6.16  1332 1832 1075 2089
5 0.25  0.25  -0.08 44.8 34.4 1.57 6.07  1327 1822 1070 2080
6 0.25  0.25  -0.07 44.6 31.9 1.58 6.02  1324 1817 1066 2075
7 0.25  0.42  -0.09 77.4 39.6 1.58 6.39  1439 1817 1090 2166
8 0.25  0.42  -0.08 76.8 35.1 1.60 6.31  1433 1807 1084 2156
9 0.25  0.42  -0.07 76.5 32.5 1.61 6.26  1430 1802 1081 2151
10 0.50  0.08  -0.11 9.9 64.9 1.58 6.36  1252 1815 1111 1956
11 0.50  0.08  -0.10 9.8 58.3 1.62 6.24  1244 1798 1100 1943
12 0.50  0.08  -0.09 9.7 54.3 1.65 6.18  1240 1788 1093 1935
13 0.50  0.25  -0.11 31.1 65.2 1.59 6.40  1288 1812 1116 1984
14 0.50  0.25  -0.10 30.7 58.6 1.63 6.29  1280 1795 1104 1971
15 0.50  0.25  -0.09 30.4 54.6 1.65 6.22  1275 1785 1097 1963
16 0.50  0.42  -0.11 52.8 66.0 1.60 6.51  1373 1806 1126 2052
17 0.50  0.42  -0.10 52.1 59.3 1.65 6.39  1364 1789 1115 2038
18 0.50  0.42  -0.09 51.7 55.3 1.67 6.32  1358 1779 1108 2030
1 The increase in the average Florida production cost related to greening and canker (Muraro). 
2 On-tree price: the FOB price minus the Florida grower margin times 6.4 SSE gallons per box, i.e., (p - m10 - m11 
log(R))*6.4. 
 Table 2. Ratio of Optimal Advertising-to-Research 












mil. $  $/ga.  Advertising Elasticity 
0.08 0.25 0.42 
10 0.25  0.25  0.79  1.32 
20 0.25  0.33  1.02  1.72 
30 0.25  0.37  1.16  1.95 
40 0.25  0.40  1.26  2.12 
50 0.25  0.43  1.34  2.25 
60 0.25  0.45  1.40  2.35 
70 0.25  0.46  1.45  2.44 
80 0.25  0.48  1.50  2.52 
90 0.25  0.49  1.54  2.59 
100 0.25  0.50  1.57  2.65 
10 0.50  0.13  0.39  0.66 
20 0.50  0.16  0.51  0.86 
30 0.50  0.19  0.58  0.98 
40 0.50  0.20  0.63  1.06 
50 0.50  0.21  0.67  1.12 
60 0.50  0.22  0.70  1.18 
70 0.50  0.23  0.73  1.22 
80 0.50  0.24  0.75  1.26 
90 0.50  0.25  0.77  1.29 
100 0.50  0.25  0.79  1.32 
1  Price margin parameters are dependent on assumed 
research expenditures, and cost of greening and 
canker; the advertising parameter is based on the 
advertising elasticity; other parameters are fixed, at 
slightly different settings than in Table 1. 
 